The Senate Access
Project
Prepared By: Josh Brodbeck
Date:
Page:
2 Executive Summary
3 Methodology
8 Findings and Analysis
17 Conclusions
Executive Summary
What would happen if an
average citizen, a complete unknown, were to contact the office of every
Inspired by the lackluster,
and likely automated, responses he received to letters he had written to his
own congressional delegation during the recent national healthcare debate,
these are the questions Josh Brodbeck sought to answer. If, all else being equal, the only difference
between a ‘no-name’ placing two meeting requests of each Senate office was his
status – a citizen, then a lobbyist – what would happen?
From these questions, the Senate Access Project was born.
Separated by one month in
the spring of 2010, Brodbeck twice contacted the office of each
For each meeting request,
the study tracked more than 20 variables ranging anywhere from a Senator’s
tenure to how much campaign money a Senator accepts from the health care lobby,
then referenced the data against whether or not a meeting was granted, and
identified trends. And, of course, the
study contrasts the differences between the request results as a citizen, and
then as a lobbyist.
All of the data collected
during the study has been independently verified by Prof. Dan Smith, a
political science professor from the
Some of the findings are
quite compelling. Highlights of the
study include:
·
Overall, the
ratio of meetings granted to Brodbeck-the-lobbyist, versus
Brodbeck-the-citizen, was almost 4:1 (3.86:1).
·
As a citizen,
the number of meeting requests that were rejected was more than 3.5 times the
number of those that were granted (3.57:1).
As a lobbyist, the number of meeting requests that were granted was
nearly twice that of those that were rejected (1.8:1).
·
The average
salary of Senate staff members he was granted a meeting with as a lobbyist was
33% higher than staff members he was to meet with as a citizen; as a lobbyist,
he would likely meet someone influential, but as a citizen, this was far less
likely.
·
Perhaps most
interesting is that, for the most pertinent findings of the study, there was
little significant difference in results between Democratic and Republican
Senate offices – there was no significant correlation to political party that
emerged anywhere within the study; as a group, the Senate offices of both major
parties behaved the same way.
The
methodology of the study, detailed analysis, and Brodbeck’s conclusions follow.
Methodology
Great
care was taken in advance and during the course of the study to account for
and/or control every conceivable variable to ensure that every private citizen
contact and lobbyist contact to each US Senate office was as consistent as
possible, in every way, with only one substantive difference; all else being
equal, the first contact to each Senate office was made by a private citizen,
while the second contact was made by a registered federal lobbyist.
In
preparation for the study, two individuals were consulted to assist in the
formation of the approach for the Senate office contacts, as well as to assist
in identifying variables to be accounted for within the data collection period
of the study. One individual is a
veteran lobbyist who has represented clients from various industries and
sectors for over 20 years. The second
individual is a federal legislative analyst employed by an industry-funded
non-profit organization who interacts with US Senate offices on a daily basis
as part of his duties. For obvious reasons, both individuals asked not to be identified
within the findings of this study; a request that will be honored. These individuals can be confidentially
verified by request, if necessary.
The
variables and/or the approaches for contending with each variable within this
study are as follows:
Timing of Contacts
The
private citizen contacts (made on
·
As the name and the individual that would be making both
the private citizen and lobbyist requests(Josh Brodbeck) would remain the same
in both instances (in an effort to eliminate intangible variables that could
otherwise emerge between different individuals making the same request – telephone
communication style, etc.), a significant period of time needed to elapse
between the private citizen and lobbyist contacts to avoid misunderstandings
and confusion that would otherwise occur if the same individual initiated
contact as a private citizen and then as a lobbyist within a narrower timeframe.
·
In addition, a significant period of time needed to elapse
between the private citizen and lobbyist contacts to avoid the possibility that
the two separate contacts to any one Senate office would be connected to one
another; enough time needed to pass between contacts so that Senate staffers
had a low likelihood of remembering the individual calling later as a lobbyist
that also called earlier as a private citizen.
·
Finally, the timing of the private citizen versus the
lobbyist contacts was carefully chosen to eliminate the possibility that more and/or
less meeting requests would be granted to a private citizen versus a lobbyist
based upon the number of days the Senate would be in session (and thus, the
amount of time a Senator would physically be in Washington, DC) during the
stated period that the private citizen and/or the lobbyist would be visiting
Washington, DC. As such, the number of
days that the Senate was in session during the stated private citizen visit
(May and June of 2010) was 38 days, and the number of days the Senate was in
session during the stated lobbyist visit (June and July of 2010) was 35 days.
Scripts for Initial Contact
The
initial contacts for both the citizen and lobbyist contacts were all made via
telephone and calls were placed to the publicly available, main ‘switchboard’
telephone number for each US Senate office.
These contacts were scripted in advance, and were closely adhered to. The initial statements made once acquiring a
Senate staffer on the phone were as follows:
As
a private citizen:
“Hi, my name is Josh
Brodbeck and I’m a private citizen calling from
As
a lobbyist:
“Hi, my name is Josh
Brodbeck and I’m a federal lobbyist based out of
Note: It was understood throughout the study that,
although meeting requests were made with actual Senators, if a meeting were to
be granted, the meeting would in all likelihood be granted with a member of
that given Senator’s staff. However,
based upon the input of the two individuals consulted in advance of this study,
as well as a desire to adhere to the purity of the intent of this study
(measuring the level of direct access to a Senator and/or a Senator’s office
based upon one’s status – citizen vs. lobbyist), it was most appropriate for
the meeting requests to be made with the Senators themselves, with this
understanding that such requests would very likely be immediately turned over
to Senate staff if they were granted.
In
some instances (less than half of the contacts for both the private citizen and
lobbyist contacts), the Senate staff member contacted posed additional
questions before issuing specific instructions and/or initiating the process to
grant a meeting request. All of these
questions were anticipated in advance, and as such, answers to those questions
were also scripted in advance. These
questions and scripted answers are as follows:
As
a private citizen:
If asked what Senate Bill 702 (hereafter S. 702) actually was, the
response was:
“The Long-Term Care Affordability and Security Act of 2009”
If asked what the bill was about, the response was:
“It essentially includes long term care insurance as a benefit under tax
exempt employee cafeteria plans and extends related consumer protections.”
If asked why a request to meet about the bill was being made, the
response was:
“I’m in favor of the bill, I’d like to express that to the Senator, give
the Senator a chance to ask me questions about my position, and then encourage
the Senator to vote for the bill.”
As
a lobbyist:
If asked what S. 702 actually was, the response was:
“The Long-Term Care Affordability and Security Act of 2009”
If asked what the bill was about, the response was:
“It essentially includes long term care insurance as a benefit under tax
exempt employee cafeteria plans and extends related consumer protections.”
If asked why a request to meet about the bill was being made, the
response was:
“My client is in favor of the bill, they would like me to express that to
the Senator, give the Senator a chance to ask me questions about their
position, and then encourage the Senator to vote for the bill.”
If asked who the client being represented was, the response was:
“Company X, a customized underwriting software developer based in
Note: An actual company granted permission for
their corporate name to be used within the study. Soliciting an actual corporation to agree to
be named if necessary for the lobbyist contacts, versus fabricating a
fictitious corporation, was an intentional decision made in an effort to avoid
potential criticism of the credibility of the study and its findings after
completion. Also of note is the primary
reason for the particular company that was selected for the study is that it
was a business that would have a logical interest in S. 702. For obvious reasons, this company has also
requested that it not be identified; a request that will be honored. However, the company can be confidentially
verified upon request, if necessary.
If asked to provide a Senate Lobbyist and Registrant/Client ID #, the
response would have been:
“Josh Brodbeck, representing Company X and my registration number is
XXXXXXXXX-XX.”
Note: The lobbyist registration number has been
redacted from these findings, as that number can be used in concert with a federal
lobbyist database, a publicly accessible database managed by congressional
staff, to reveal the identity of the actual company named in the lobbyist
contacts. This number can be
confidentially verified upon request, if necessary. Of interest, however, is that although a
request to provide identifying information to verify official federal lobbyist
registration was conceived as a possibility within the study, not once during
the study did a Senate office actively request such identifying information.
|
|
|
|
If asked what the client’s interest in that particular state is, the
response was:
“As many of Company X’s customers are national companies, they indirectly
have a presence in all 50 states.”
Note: As this question was clearly only applicable
to the lobbyist contacts, and it was indeed asked in relatively few instances,
the response was intentionally crafted so as not to give the impression that
the lobbyist’s client, who is presumably impacted by and has an interest in S.
702, has any more or less of an interest in a given Senator’s state than a
private citizen, who is also presumably impacted by and has an interest in the
bill, would have. Never was it stated,
nor was the impression given, that Company X had a specific interest in a given
Senator’s state (the corporation was an employer in a given state, had
facilities in a given state, etc.) other than gaining that Senator’s support
for S. 702; which was equal to the interest in that bill that the private
citizen also impacted by this bill and making the same request would have. Put differently, the answer to this question
was crafted in a manner that would ensure that what the lobbyist wanted from a
given Senator – a ‘yes’ vote on S. 702 – was the same as what the citizen
wanted, and that the particular interest the lobbyist’s client had in a given
Senator’s state was comparatively equal to that of a citizen also interested in
the same bill.
Reason for Contact -- S. 702
To
eliminate every conceivable reason that a Senator’s office would reject a
meeting request to discuss a certain bill out-of-hand based on the actual bill
a Senate office was being contacted about, the selection of the bill used as
the basis for the meeting request was very carefully considered. As such, the criteria for the bill that was
selected were as follows:
·
Timeliness of Topic:
The policy issue that the selected bill is related to needed to be a
topic that was receiving considerable public attention and scrutiny during the
course of the study. The bill needed to
contend with an issue that no Senate office could claim a legitimate disinterest
in.
·
Bi-Partisan Sponsorship:
To eliminate the possibility that a Senate office would have a
diminished interest in discussing a bill based upon sponsorship solely from the
majority or minority party, whichever would apply, the bill needed to have
bi-partisan sponsorship from roughly an equal number of Senators from both the
majority and minority parties.
Additionally, Senate bills possessing strong bi-partisan sponsorship
have a higher likelihood of eventually being voted upon on the Senate floor,
thus greatly diminishing the possibility that a given Senate office would be
disinterested in discussing such a bill for the belief that it will never be
voted upon.
·
Committee Status: To
greatly reduce the possibility that a bill would emerge from committee and be
voted upon during the course of the study, thus negating the entire effort, the
bill needed to have been assigned to a committee that has been considering the bill
for some time (more than ~6 months).
This would suggest that, given 2010 is an election year, there was a low
likelihood that such a bill would be voted upon before the 2010 general
election.
S.
702 fit all of these criteria, and thus, it was selected as the subject bill
for this study.
Post-Contact
After
making initial contact with each Senate office, the process that was required
to make a formal meeting request of that Senator/Senate office varied widely
from Senate office to Senate office.
Some offices allowed the request to be submitted by phone and would
forward that request to an applicable party within that Senate office, others
required the request to be submitted via e-mail, others required the request to
be submitted via facsimile, while others featured a web interface on that
Senate office’s official website that allowed for meeting requests to be
submitted. For the purposes of this
study, a meeting request was considered to be complete once the full process
and all requirements to submit a formal meeting request, per the requirements
of each Senate office, had been fully satisfied.
Whatever
the required process of each Senate office, that process was completed in full
to the exact specifications of each Senate office twice (once for the private
citizen requests, and again for the lobbyist requests) for all 100 Senate
offices, with no exceptions; 200 formal requests were submitted per the
requirements of each office. In all
instances, the manner in which information was conveyed to each Senate office
in submitting the actual meeting request to each office, per the requirements
of each office, was completely consistent with all information conveyed in the
initial contact to each office. Put
simply, although meeting requests were submitted in various formats, the
information contained in each request was completely consistent from request to
request.
Finally,
in an effort not to skew any post-request results, after the request process
associated with each Senate office was completed per each office’s
specifications, any and all follow-up and/or additional interaction with any
Senate office was completely passive in nature; all additional interaction
post-request, but before a definitive response to the request was given, would
have needed to be initiated by a Senate office only. In other words, no more or less effort was
devoted to eliciting a definitive response from any one Senate office than from
any other.
Findings and Analysis
Meetings Granted
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Meetings
granted with a Senator |
0 |
2 |
|
Meetings
granted with a staff member |
7 |
25 |
|
Total meetings granted |
7 |
27 |
Key Finding: Essentially, an individual identifying him/herself
as a lobbyist is 3.86, or nearly 4 times, more likely to obtain a meeting with
a Senator and/or a Senate staff member than when the same individual identifies
him/herself as a private citizen.
Political Affiliation
Following
are the meetings granted broken out by political affiliation:
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Republican
Senate Offices |
3 |
13 |
|
Democratic
Senate Offices |
4 |
13 |
|
Independent
Senate Offices |
0 |
1 |
|
Total |
7 |
27 |
Key Finding: Clearly there is no correlation between
political party of a Senate office and one’s likelihood to be granted a
meeting, whether a private citizen or a lobbyist, by that Senate office.
Meeting Overlap
Of
the 7 Senate offices that granted a meeting in response to a citizen request, 4
(3 Dem, 1 Rep) of them also granted a meeting request in response to the
lobbyist request.
Sponsorship
There
are a total of 8 sponsors for S. 702; 5 Republicans and 3 Democrats.
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Meeting
requests granted |
0 |
3
(1 Dem, 2 Rep) |
|
Meeting
requests rejected |
2
(1 Dem, 1 Rep) |
1
(1 Rep) |
|
No
response to meeting request |
6
(2 Dem, 4 Rep) |
4
(2 Dem, 2 Rep) |
Key Findings:
·
For Citizen requests, there does not appear to be a significant
correlation between whether a Senator is a sponsor of S. 702 (or perhaps any
bill) and whether or not a meeting request is granted, as no meetings were
granted.
·
For Lobbyist requests, there is a clear correlation between
sponsors of S. 702 and their desire to grant a meeting request to a lobbyist
with an interest in the bill.
Response Rate
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Total
meeting request responses |
32
(19 Dem, 13 Rep) |
42
(24 Dem, 2 |
|
…requests granted |
7 (3 Dem, 4 Rep) |
27 (13 Dem, 1 |
|
…requests rejected |
25 (15 Dem, 10 Rep) |
15 (10 Dem, 1 |
|
No
response to meeting request |
68
(38 Dem, 2 |
58
(33 Dem, 25 Rep) |
Note: For the purposes of this study, a ‘response’
was defined as a definitive answer in the affirmative or negative to the
meeting request; in some cases, there were multiple contacts with a given
Senate office before a definitive response to the meeting request was
received. Most Senate offices with which
multiple contacts were made also definitively responded at some point, and conversely,
most Senate offices that never responded to a meeting request usually involved
only one instance of contact.
Key Findings:
· A meeting request from an
unknown citizen (to Senate offices) has a 32% chance of receiving a response,
while a meeting request from an unknown lobbyist has a 42% chance of receiving
a response.
· There is a much higher
likelihood that a response to a lobbyist will be in the affirmative (64% of
responses to lobbyists were to grant a meeting) than a response to a citizen
will be in the affirmative (22% of responses to a citizen were to grant a
meeting).
Response Overlap
|
|
#
of Senate Offices |
|
Responded
to Citizen Request, but not to Lobbyist Request |
15
(7 Dem, 8 Rep) |
|
Responded to Lobbyist
Request, but not to Citizen Request |
26 (12 Dem, 2 |
|
Responded to both
Requests |
17 (12 Dem, 5 Rep) |
|
Responded
to neither Request |
42
(26 Dem, 16 Rep) |
Note: For the purposes of this study, a ‘response’
was defined as a definitive answer in the affirmative or negative to the
meeting request; in some cases, there were multiple contacts with a given
Senate office before a definitive response to the meeting request was
received. Most Senate offices with which
multiple contacts were made also definitively responded at some point, and
conversely, most Senate offices that never responded to a meeting request
usually involved only one instance of contact.
Response Time
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Average
response time for Senators whose offices granted request. |
16.14
days |
12.15
days |
|
Average
response time for Senators whose offices rejected request. |
6.68
days |
10.93
days |
Note: For the purposes of this study, a ‘response’
was defined as a definitive answer in the affirmative or negative to the
meeting request; in some cases, there were multiple contacts with a given
Senate office before a definitive response to the meeting request was
received. Most Senate offices with which
multiple contacts were made also definitively responded at some point, and
conversely, most Senate offices that never responded to a meeting request
usually involved only one instance of contact.
So in this instance, response time was calculated as the number of days
that elapsed between the original request and a response to the request as
defined above.
Tenure
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Senators
whose offices granted request that are in their 1st term and/or
are serving a partial term (appointments, etc.). |
4
(3 Dem, 1 Rep) |
11
(6 Dem, 1 |
|
Senators
whose offices granted request that are in their 2nd term. |
1
(Dem) |
5
(1 Dem, 4 Rep) |
|
Senators
whose offices granted a request that are in their 3rd or more
terms. |
2
(2 Rep) |
11
(7 Dem, 4 Rep) |
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Senators
whose offices rejected request that are in their 1st term and/or
are serving a partial term(appointments, etc.). |
9
(7 Dem, 2 Rep) |
3
(3 Dem) |
|
Senators
whose offices rejected request that are in their 2nd term. |
5
(2 Dem, 3 Rep) |
5
(3 Dem, 2 Rep) |
|
Senators
whose offices rejected request that are in their 3rd or more
terms. |
11
(6 Dem, 5 Rep) |
7
(4 Dem, 1 |
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Senators
whose offices did not respond that are in their 1st term and/or
are serving a partial term(appointments, etc.). |
23
(12 Dem, 1 |
21
(12 Dem, 9 Rep) |
|
Senators
whose offices did not respond that are in their 2nd term. |
14
(8 Dem, 6 Rep) |
11
(8 Dem, 3 Rep) |
|
Senators
whose offices did not respond that are in their 3rd or more terms. |
31
(18 Dem, 1 |
26
(13 Dem, 13 Rep) |
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Average
tenure of Senators whose offices granted request. |
6.14
years |
10.33
years |
|
Average
tenure of Senators whose offices rejected request. |
12.0
years |
14.40
years |
|
Average
tenure of Senators whose offices did not respond. |
13.25
years |
12.92
years |
Average
tenure of all
Key Findings:
·
Data suggests that, for citizens making a request, as a
Senator’s tenure increases, there is a declining likelihood that a citizen will
be granted a meeting request, or receive any response at all.
·
Data also suggests that a lobbyist is more likely than a
citizen to be granted a meeting and/or receive a response to a meeting request
as a Senator’s tenure increases.
Proximity to Re-Election: Senate Offices that Granted a Meeting
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Next
Election in 2010 |
4
(3 Dem, 1 Rep) |
9
(4 Dem, 5 Rep) |
|
Next
Election in 2012 |
0 |
9 (4 Dem, 1 |
|
Next
Election in 2014 |
3 (1 Dem, 2 Rep) |
9 (6 Dem, 3 Rep) |
Key Finding: For those meetings granted to lobbyists,
there is no correlation between the timing of a Senator’s next election and
granting a lobbyist’s meeting request; these appear to be consistent practices.
Proximity to Re-Election: Senate Offices that Rejected a Meeting
Request
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Next
Election in 2010 |
6
(3 Dem, 3 Rep) |
2
(1 Dem, 1 Rep) |
|
Next
Election in 2012 |
4 (3 Dem, 1 Rep) |
6 (4 Dem, 1 |
|
Next
Election in 2014 |
15 (9 Dem, 6 Rep) |
7 (5 Dem, 2 Rep) |
Key Finding: For citizen requests, there is a clear
correlation between those Senators up for re-election in 2014 and rejecting a
citizen meeting request; those Senators up for re-election in 2014 will reject
a citizen meeting request by an approximate margin of 3:1 versus those Senators
up for re-election in 2010 or 2012.
Proximity to Re-Election: Senate Offices that Did Not Respond to a
Meeting Request
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Next
Election in 2010 |
24
(10 Dem, 14 Rep) |
23
(11 Dem, 12 Rep) |
|
Next
Election in 2012 |
29 (18 Dem, 2 |
18 (13 Dem, 5 Rep) |
|
Next
Election in 2014 |
15 (10 Dem, 5 Rep) |
17 (9 Dem, 8 Rep) |
Relevance of Constituency/Interest
of the Individual Making Meeting Request in a Given Senator’s State
It
was suggested by more than one individual consulted in advance of this study
that, as lobbyists can and often do represent clients with interests in multiple
US states, this factor alone could be a driver for an increased likelihood of a
Senate office to respond to and/or grant a meeting request from a lobbyist
representing a particular client.
Conversely, as a citizen is obviously a constituent of only one state,
this factor could similarly be a driver for a decreased likelihood of a Senate
office other than one representing that citizen to respond to and/or grant a
meeting request to such a citizen.
Although
it can be argued as to whether or not the constituency of a citizen versus that
of a client being represented by a lobbyist should be a driver of
responsiveness to and/or granting meeting requests to citizens vs. lobbyists,
this is nonetheless a valid point. As
such, if this factor were a driver for one or more Senate offices related to
meeting requests, then it is appropriate to expect a Senate office considering
granting a meeting request to a lobbyist to confirm whether or not the client a
lobbyist is making a meeting request on behalf of has a legitimate interest in
that particular Senator’s state. Whether
or not a Senate office confirmed that a lobbyist’s client had a legitimate
interest in that Senator’s state was tracked and quantified as a part of this
study.
|
|
#
of Senate Offices |
|
Confirmed
legitimacy of client interest in that Senator’s state when granting a
meeting. |
4
(2 Dem, 2 Rep) of 27 meetings granted. |
|
Confirmed
legitimacy of client interest in that Senator’s state when rejecting a meeting
request. |
1 (Dem) of 15 requests rejected. |
|
Confirmed
legitimacy of client interest in that Senator’s state and did not respond to
a meeting request. |
3 (2 Dem, 1 Rep) of 58 non-responses. |
Key Finding: As only 5 of 42 Senate offices that responded
to a meeting request (27 granted a meeting, 15 did not) actually inquired into
the interest that a lobbyist’s client had in the states of those respective
offices, it is clear that whether or not a lobbyist’s client has a legitimate
interest in a Senator’s state is not a driving factor for the US Senate offices
as a whole when considering whether or not to grant a meeting to that lobbyist.
Level of Influence of Meeting
Participants
In
all but 2 instances, meetings that were granted both in response to citizen and
lobbyist requests were scheduled with Senate staffers; a common practice. In the aforementioned 2 instances, those were
meetings that were scheduled with actual
|
|
Citizen
Meetings |
Lobbyist
Meetings |
|
Average
annual staff member salaries* of staffers with which meetings were granted. |
$58,067.77 |
$77,368.93 |
*:
Salary figures were acquired from www.legistorm.com.
Key Findings:
·
The average salary of staff members with which meetings
were granted resulting from a lobbyist request was 33% higher than for meetings
resulting from a citizen request.
·
13 (of a total of 27) meetings granted resulting from a
lobbyist request were with staffers making over $75,000/year.
·
2 (of a total of 7) meetings granted resulting from a
citizen request were with staffers making over $75,000/year.
Relationship Between Meeting
Request Responses/Non-Responses and Contributions Received from Health Related
Organizations and Their Lobbyists
As
S.702 is a health care related bill, it is useful to examine the amount of
financial campaign contributions received by Senators from health organizations
and their lobbyists with relation to the meeting requests as part of this
study.
The
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) recently completed a compilation of
members of Congress who received
campaign contributions from at least one health or health insurance
organization and 10 of their outside lobbyists between January 2007 and June
2009. The results can be found at the
following link: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/lm_health.php?type=M .
The following data is a
result of the data from the CRP study being cross referenced to the findings of
this study.
Average
total contribution per qualifying Senator:
$92,276.90
Number
of Total Qualifying Senators: 40
|
|
Citizen
Meetings |
Lobbyist
Meetings |
|
Meeting Requests Granted |
|
|
|
#
of Senators who received contributions from at least 1 health organization
and 10 outside lobbyists from 1/07-6/09 |
4
(2 Dem, 2 Rep) of 7 meetings granted. |
9 (5 Dem, 4 Rep) of 27 meetings
granted. |
|
Average
total contribution amount per qualifying Senator. |
$39,177.50 |
$103,226.22 |
|
Meeting Requests
Rejected |
|
|
|
#
of Senators who received contributions from at least 1 health organization
and 10 outside lobbyists from 1/07-6/09 |
14 (7 Dem, 7 Rep) of 25 meetings rejected. |
9 (6 Dem, 3 Rep) of 15 meetings rejected. |
|
Average
total contribution amount per qualifying Senator. |
$154,807.21 |
$133,970.00 |
|
Meeting Requests with No
Response |
|
|
|
#
of Senators who received contributions from at least 1 health organization
and 10 outside lobbyists from 1/07-6/09 |
22 (15 Dem, 7 Rep) of 68 non-responses. |
22 (13 Dem, 9 Rep) of 58 non-responses. |
|
Average
total contribution amount per qualifying Senator. |
$69,412.05 |
$78,014.09 |
Key Findings: The data clearly suggests that a citizen
desiring to discuss a particular bill with a Senator/Senate office that has
received an above average amount of campaign contributions from an industry
and/or related lobbyists whom have an interest in that same bill is much less
likely than a lobbyist to be granted a meeting.
Constituent Population*
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
Average
constituent population of Senators whose offices granted request. |
6,032,412 |
6,943,702 |
|
Average
constituent population of Senators whose offices rejected request. |
5,225,124 |
5,244,355 |
|
Average
constituent population of Senators whose offices did not respond. |
6,469,983 |
5,977,043 |
*: Figures based on
Average
Key Finding: The population of a constituency that a
Senator represents does not appear to be correlated to whether or not a meeting
was granted, or if the request was responded to.
Difficulty of Submitting Request
Soon
after the inception of the study, it became clear that the manner in which
meeting requests were handled varied from Senate office to Senate office. However, despite this variance between
offices, there were three objective variables that immediately emerged when submitting
meeting requests that were tracked as a part of the study:
1. Whether or not a meeting request was required
to be submitted in writing;
2. Whether or not additional contact was
required with a Senate office after the initial meeting request was submitted
(citizen/lobbyist was asked to call again, referred to other staff members,
etc.), and;
3. Whether or not the citizen/lobbyist
submitting the request was immediately, or quickly, connected to a staff member
that possessed decision making authority over granting a meeting or not (Senate
scheduler, etc.).
These
three factors, combined or individually, serve as a reliable indicator as to
the level of difficulty involved with submitting and/or receiving a response to
a meeting request.
|
|
Citizen
Requests |
Lobbyist
Requests |
|
#
of Senate offices that required a meeting request to be submitted in writing. |
79(44 Dem, 2 |
77
(45 Dem, 2 |
|
# of Senate offices where
multiple contacts were necessary before request could be considered submitted. |
22
(13 Dem, 9 Rep) |
15
(7 Dem, 8 Rep) |
|
#
of Senate offices that immediately put requestor in contact with a meeting
decision maker. |
35
(14 Dem, 21 Rep) |
69
(37 Dem, 1 |
Key Finding: There is a clear correlation between a
lobbyist submitting a meeting request and the chances of that person being
quickly placed in contact with a Senate staffer that has influence over
granting meetings; at almost twice the rate of the citizen requests, a lobbyist
was quickly placed in contact with such an individual. Put simply, a lobbyist simply has an easier
time contacting a Senate office and quickly being put in touch with someone who
can materially assist him/her.
Conclusions
Before
an articulation of any conclusions from this study can be stated, the type of
study that the Senate Access Project
essentially amounts to should be noted.
The Senate Access Project is
what can be characterized as a study of organizational function. In this case, the function studied was that
of requesting a meeting, or by extension, requesting access, to a Senator or
Senate office followed by the various processes, interactions, and events that
resulted from each initial request. Likewise,
the organization within which this function was examined was the U.S. Senate as
a whole, and more specifically all 100 Senate offices; each of which have this
function in common to varying degrees.
As
such, one undeniable conclusion of this study is that, from a purely
operational perspective, gaining meaningful access (i.e. a face-to-face meeting
to discuss pending legislation, etc.) to a U.S. Senator/Senate office is
clearly correlated to the status (citizen vs. lobbyist) of the party requesting
access. Based on this study’s findings,
a generically unknown citizen requesting such access can expect:
·
a 68% probability that s/he will receive no response at all,
·
of the responses s/he does receive, a 78% probability that
the request will be rejected, and
·
of the actual access/meetings that are granted, a 71%
probability that those meetings will be arranged with a Senate staff member of
little or no influence within any given Senate office.
Conversely,
a generically unknown lobbyist requesting the same access can expect:
·
a 42% probability that his/her request will receive a
response,
·
a 64% probability that a responding Senate office will
grant such access, and
·
a 48% probability that any access/meeting that is granted
will be scheduled with a Senate staff member(or, in two cases, an actual
Senator) who is of consequence within any given Senate office.
In
any organization and group of sub-organizations, such as the U.S. Senate, a
single operational function that is practiced as predictably as this function
is, as demonstrated in this study, suggests that such a practice is systemic
and cultural. It’s simply part of the
culture of the U.S. Senate and each of its Senate offices to ‘handle’ citizens
and lobbyists differently, even though they may be seeking the same thing. In addition to the objective data collected
in the study, countless vignettes can also be recounted to substantiate a clear
conclusion:
Far
more often than not, a lobbyist contacting a Senate office will have a more
responsive, streamlined, and professional experience – with a much higher
likelihood of receiving the desired result – than a citizen will likely
have.
As
to the underlying root causes of this dynamic, this is open to interpretation.
·
Some might suggest that it is about money; lobbyists and
their clients contribute far more of it to members of Congress than true
individual citizens do.
·
Others would suggest it is a matter of timing; citizens
receive the focus and attention of their
·
Yet others would
suggest that, as federal lobbyists already have an enhanced opportunity
for access to Senators by virtue of their full time presence in Washington and
existing relationships with Senate staff, to whatever extent voters become more
and more turned off by their members of Congress, and thus stop paying
attention to their behavior, this window of opportunity for the full-time
Washington lobby only expands.
·
And finally, some would say that this is simply a perpetual
symptom of the dysfunction of
Each
of these points of view may indeed be valid, and there is ample data within
this study to substantiate each one.